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TRAINING AND WATCHKEEPING  
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## MEASURES TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY

### The review of resolution A.890(21) on Principles of Safe Manning

Submitted by the ICFTU

#### SUMMARY

- Executive summary:** This paper addresses the issues which need to be included in the review of resolution A.890(21) and the increased duties seafarers will be required to perform to implement the new security measures.
- Action to be taken:** Paragraph 16
- Related documents:** MSC 71/23, MSC 76/4/5, MSC 76 Report, SOLAS/CONF.5/Res.3, SOLAS/CONF.5/DC/2 and SOLAS/CONF.5/DC/2/Add.1

#### Background

1 The Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security adopted Conference Resolution 3 which recognised the need for further work pertaining to the enhancement of maritime security. In operative paragraph 1(e) it invited the Organization to “review the Assembly resolution A.890(21) on Principles of safe manning”. MSC 76 agreed to refer this issue to the STW Sub-Committee.

#### Security considerations

2 The scope of the role, responsibilities and training requirements of a ship’s security officer are broadly established in the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which will enter into force on 1 July 2004. It will, however, be difficult to assess the requirements in a precise manner until there has been some experience in the developing and approval of ship’s security plans. It is clear from the provisions that there will also be a considerable number of onerous security duties assigned to individual crew members, although again it will be difficult to assess the full extent until there has been more experience in the development and approval of ship’s security plans.

3 The role of the designated ship security officer is fairly onerous, involving not only maintaining and supervising the ship’s security plan but also training and increasing the awareness and vigilance of the crew on an ongoing basis. The skills required in Part B are extensive and generally outside those traditionally expected of a seafarer and, with organising the appropriate drills and exercises, involve a significant additional workload. The implementation

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of the ship's security plan will require all the crew to be able to operate as an effective team as they discharge their security duties. The maintenance, testing and monitoring or in some cases assembling of security equipment in particular areas may generate significant workload and possibly skills which are not generally available. This is particularly the case with regards to the skills of radio, electronics or electrical officers. The potential work implications are illustrated using the example of a recent innovation which is being offered for carriage on ships: the 9,000 volt security perimeter wire takes four persons four hours to assemble and cannot remain in position whilst the vessel is in port. On many of today's ships with a very low minimum manning it would be difficult to find the number of personnel and the time to use such security equipment. Moreover, the highest period of risk and the majority of the security duties are likely to occur at times of peak workload.

4 The security related duties and functions of the ship's security officer and the crew are also likely to be effected by the requirements established by a particular port which are based on the port facility security plan. This is another area that is hard to assess until there is more experience in the development and approval of port facility security plans. However, the ISPS Code establishes that the ship's security should be co-ordinated with the port facility security arrangements. There are aspects like supervising the security aspects of stores and cargo operations. There are duties that will probably take more than one person and may span a considerable period of time. At higher levels of security the requirement for escorting and fully monitoring the activities of shore based personnel and visitors under most existing manning levels would be impossible. The ICFTU believes that these functions are integral to the ship's security and, as such and based on the construction of the ISPS Code, cannot be delegated to other staff employed in the port.

5 It is clear that the full extent of security duties and the expectations established by the ISPS Code can only be properly assessed when the further work has been carried out on the formulation and approval of ship and port facility security plans. Only when the experience gained during this process and when a more detailed assessment has been undertaken of security training requirements and methods of implementation will it be possible to fully assess the implications on minimum safe manning. However, it is already clear that there will undoubtedly be a requirement for a substantial amount of extra record keeping and administration involving the ship's security officer, who will also have to interface with both the company security officer and the various port facility security officers. Our experience with the implementation of the ISM Code indicates that many ship's officers have been unable to carry out these duties within their already full working day and too often use their rest periods to undertake such work.

6 The ICFTU considers that one aspect of the review of A.890 should be to assess, in conjunction with the existing requirements, especially those generated by the ISM Code, the growing level of administrative and clerical duties on board ships. A lot has been said about the increased number of ship's inspections and these are likely to be further increased through additional security related ones.

7 The ICFTU is also aware that Conference Resolution 8 (Enhancement of security in co-operation with the ILO) established a joint IMO/ILO Working Group on Port Security and its terms of reference. It is likely that the outcome of this group will also impact upon the workload of ship's crews.

8 Experience in the implementation of the agreed measures to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships has indicated that one of the most effective deterrents is the availability of adequate numbers of well-trained and vigilant crew members. Even where security aids such as CCTV are fitted, they are only useful if they are used and this requires 24-hour monitoring, at

least in places where there may be a threat. It should be recalled that the majority of attacks on ships by pirates or armed robbers have been aborted when detected at an early stage by the ship's crew and the security measures required under the ISPS Code will similarly only be effective if the crew have sufficient time to carry out **all their** duties efficiently.

9 The Diplomatic Conference was aware of the manning implications of the new security regime and adopted section 4.28 in Part B of the ISPS Code under the sub-heading of manning level. It provides:

*“In establishing the minimum safe manning of a ship the Administration should take into account that the minimum manning provisions established by regulation V/14 only address the safe navigation of the ship. The Administration should also take into account any additional workload which may result from the implementation of the ship's security plan and ensure that the ship is sufficiently and effectively manned. In doing so the Administration should verify that ships are able to implement the hours of rest and other measures to address fatigue which have been promulgated by national law, in the context of all shipboard duties assigned to the various shipboard personnel.”*

There is a footnote referring to Conference resolution 3 and the review of Assembly resolution A.890(22) on Principles of Safe manning, which also suggests that the review may also lead to an amendment of SOLAS Regulation V/14. This clearly indicates the need for a careful consideration of the provisions contained in A.890 and all their implications when the new security regime is in force. It is essential that the review is all embracing and suitable time is available for a careful consideration of all the aspects so that we get it right.

### **Other considerations**

10 The ICFTU considers that there is a need to consider the security related aspects in the context of the current situation prevalent on ships and that there is a need to take into consideration other aspects that have a bearing on existing workloads. It should be recalled that MSC 71 (MSC 71/23 paragraphs 6.16 and 6.17), when forwarding the draft resolution (A.890) to the Assembly, stated ‘ ***the committee view was that it would be premature to consider further work on this issue until experience had been gained in the use of the principles of safe manning in the revised resolution.***’ The STW should, as part of the review of A.890, after three years of experience, also carry out the comprehensive review envisaged by MSC 71 and as provided for in operative paragraph 5 of the resolution. It should be noted that there have been a considerable number of changes since this date and important IMO Instruments have come into full force.

11 At the time resolution A.890(21) was adopted the 1995 amendments to STCW 78 were not fully in force and now flag States are responsible for compliance with Regulation VIII/1 and must ensure the minimum hours of rest are provided for watchkeepers and records are kept of the hours worked. Also, since 1 July 2002, all vessels over 500 GT must comply with provisions contained in the ISM Code. There has been concern at the workload on ship's staff involved in implementing the ISM Code and it should now be possible to quantify the extent of these duties and the time taken in the range of ships inspections by authorities. The other aspects of the ISM Code which must be taken into account are covered in the Code's Objectives, especially section 1.2.3 which provides that the safety management system should ensure:

1. *compliance with mandatory rules and regulations; and*

2. *that applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organisation, Administration, classification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account.*

12 This would involve the consideration of issues related to ILO Convention 147 and in particular ILO Convention 180 (Seafarers' Hours of work and the Manning of Ships). This aspect is supported by Section 2 of resolution A.890(21).

13 Since the adoption of IMO resolution A.772(18) (Fatigue factors in manning and safety) the Organization has adopted MSC circulars 493, 565, 566 and 621 and this year, after extensive work at the Maritime Safety Committee, the Organization has published "Guidelines on Fatigue".

14 MSC 76 considered a document submitted by the Philippines (MSC 76/4/5) which called for the reinstatement of the Radio Officer whose traditional functions should be expanded to include complimenting and covering the duties of the Ship Security Officer, ISM related clerical duties, electronic maintenance and to cover the increasing areas of administrative/record keeping. MSC 76 decided (paragraph 4.48 of the report) to forward the matter to the Maritime Security Working Group, who in turn agreed to pass it to the STW Sub-Committee for further action. The Sub-Committee is clearly mandated to consider the Philippines document as part of its review of A.890 and therefore to consider the increased duties of ship's personnel in all areas, as part of its assessment of the new security related workload.

15 The ICFTU is firmly of the view that the review of A.890 must include an assessment of the effectiveness of the existing provisions, based on the experience that has been gained on their implementation and in light of developments since their adoption. To do otherwise would prejudice the implementation of the new security provisions and the ISPS Code. The addition of guidance on manning in the ISPS Code means that the workload implications have been flagged up and it is better to fully consider all aspects rather than to get it wrong through seeking to complete the work in a single session in order to secure its adoption at the 2003 IMO Assembly. The time between the Diplomatic Conference and the STW Sub-Committee as well as the large number of issues which need further elaboration mean that it will not be possible to take into account all the relevant aspects at this session.

#### **Action requested of the Sub-Committee**

- 16 The Sub-Committee is invited in its review of resolution A.890(21) to consider:
- .1 the issues raised in this paper;
  - .2 all possible additional duties involved in the implementation of the new security measures;
  - .3 the need to give greater guidance to comply with the rest requirements contained in STCW 95 and in national law;
  - .4 the measures the Organization has developed to address and prevent fatigue;
  - .5 the need for more experience in the elaboration and approval of ship and port facility security plans; and
  - .6 the current increasing workload for seafarers, particularly in the area of additional administration and inspections.